regarding which methodology is best for valuing loss of choice and whether it is 37 importance to the final implementation decision is warranted. 38
Introduction

43
Governments are increasing their focus on preventative public health programmes to 44 contain rising health costs caused by population ageing and the availability of more 45 effective but costly technologies. Public health programmes can be introduced on 46 either a voluntary or mandatory basis. Voluntary programmes give consumers the 47 option (or 'choice') of adhering to a particular programme and impose no penalties for 48 non adherence. Mandatory health programmes (MHP) require government legislation, 49 but are appealing because there are significant savings in terms of enforcement and 50 promotion costs in addition to being the most effective method of ensuring population 51 compliance [1] . 52
Recently some Governments have commissioned economic evaluations of MHPs to 53 ascertain whether they result in a net gain to society [2] [3] [4] . The evaluation of MHPs, 54 such as fortification and immunisation programmes, involves balancing two essential 55 factors -benefits and risks -in the population. That is to say, the potential societal 56 benefits (such as improved compliance) must be balanced against the risks, and 57 potential harms, to individuals and communities [5] . While some people will benefit 58 from MHPs, not all people will benefit and a small minority may experience harm, for 59 example through adverse events. 60
Regardless of whether the programme enforces or bans consumption of a good, MHPs 61 restrict personal choice and deny consumers the ability to readily substitute particular 62 goods or services. For example, some people may value the loss of the availability of 63
Insert Table 1 here 123
Of the 39 MPH economic evaluations identified, five studies(7 articles) 4 attempted to 124 value loss of consumer choice [2, 16, 31-33, 37, 47] while a further four studies 125 mentioned that the introduction of a MHP would result in a loss of consumer choice 126 [3, 4, 11, 34] . One additional study did not mention consumer choice directly, but 127 estimated the loss in terms of people who quit cycling as a consequence of the 128 introduction of mandatory helmet wearing legislation [28] (see Table 2 ). These 129 articles are discussed below. 130
Insert Table 2 here. 131
Several methods have been suggested for valuing loss of consumer choice, these 132 include: the cost of compliance, price elasticities, lost productivity and contingent 133 valuation. The relative merits of each are discussed below. 134
The cost of compliance 135
Two studies that evaluated the cost-effectiveness of mandatory bicycle helmet 136 legislation assumed that the maximum value of loss of consumer choice, to people 137 who subsequently quit cycling, was the cost of complying with the regulation (i.e. the 138 cost of a helmet) [16, 28] . The use of the Marshallian demand curve is appropriate in 139 the case of bicycle helmet legislation as the income effect of a once-off purchase of a 140 helmet is likely to be small. This is because the Hicksian compensated demand curve 141 approaches the Marshallian demand curve as the income effect approaches zero [48] . 142
However the methodology utilised overestimates the loss of consumer surplus -if it is 143 assumed that the value each person places is uniformly distributed between zero and 144 the cost of the helmet, thus the demand curve is linear and the loss of consumer 145 surplus is a triangle, a closer approximation to the loss of consumer choice would be 146 halve this number. However if the demand curve is convex to the origin, the loss of 147 consumer surplus would remain overestimated. 148
A similar methodology was applied in an economic evaluation of restrictions on 149 smoking in workplaces [37] . It was assumed the maximum value of loss of consumer 150 choice to people who subsequently quit smoking was half their total expenditure on 151 cigarettes forgone (assumed to be 20 cigarettes a day). In the cycle helmet example, 152 this is akin to measuring the loss of consumer choice to cyclists on the basis of the 153 cost of the bike rather than the helmet. Thus in the case of smoking, a more 154 appropriate proxy would be the inconvenience of finding a designated smoking area 155 or the value of cigarettes not consumed during working hours. The authors note that 156 those who choose to stop altogether may welcome the ban as a cessation aid. 157
Consequently their loss of consumer choice is likely to be much lower. Importantly, 158 the methodology of estimating the cost of compliance does not consider the loss in 159 consumer choice incurred by individuals who face no other alternatives (such as 160 compulsory vaccination). 161
Price Elasticities 162
An alternative approach used to estimate the loss of consumer choice in continuing 163 smokers was to multiply the reduction in cigarettes consumed at work by the price 164 increase that would lead to the same change in behaviour, using price elasticities 165 reported in the literature, multiplied by half [37] . This methodology estimates the loss 166 of consumer choice using the Marshallian demand curve and assumes that the income 167 effect of banning smoking in workplaces is small. This is a strong assumption since 168 expenditure on cigarettes can be over a fifth of total income in the lowest 169 socioeconomic group [49] . Furthermore price elasticity estimates based on small 170 changes in taxation may not be appropriate for extreme policy changes (such as 171 banning or forced consumption). Price elasticity estimates are often based on surveys 172 or natural experiments involving people who voluntarily consume a good, not those 173 for whom consuming a good gives them a negative utility. Consequently this 174 methodology may underestimate the loss of consumer choice from forcing 175 consumption. Finally, this methodology relies on the availability of price elasticity 176 estimates, which may be problematic in circumstances when the good is not normally 177 traded in the market place (such as fluoridated water). 178
Lost Productivity 179
Another alternative was to estimate drivers of the loss of consumer choice separately. 180
For example, one study estimated the additional inconvenience incurred by smokers 181 in terms of the lost productivity associated with time required to find a designated 182 smoking area during work hours [37] . However, this cost may be incurred (partially or 183 fully) by the employer rather than the employee and thus is not an accurate estimate of 184 inconvenience. Furthermore this methodology does not value other factors driving 185 loss of consumer surplus, such as the inconvenience to the smoker of standing outside 186 in the cold wet weather. 187
Contingent valuation 188
Stated preference methods have been used to value loss of consumer choice. The study also identified a group of respondents, referred to as "protesters", who 204 refused to provide information regarding their WTP for water fluoridation, citing that 205 they were "paying enough taxes/water rates already" or "the water companies should 206 pay" (against taxation in general), or no amount of money would be sufficient to 207 compensate for fluoride being added to the drinking water. 208
Another study used contingent valuation to examine the impact of introducing folate 209 fortification of flour. However, the study only explored the WTP for the introduction 210 of the programme and not the WTP to avoid the introduction of the programme [32] . 211
The study identified a group of respondents, referred to as "protesters" or "zeros", 212 who refused to provide information regarding their WTP for folate fortification. 213
Reasons cited by these respondents included "manufacturers should pay or simply 214 increase the price of food" (against taxation in general), or "there are other issues that 215 I feel more strongly about" (awareness of opportunity cost), the respondent was too 216 poor to pay any money (income bias), "it would only benefit pregnant women and not 217 all society" or "because I don't need it personally" (irrelevance or non-altruistic 218 reasons), "people should know about folic acid already" and "people already have 219 good access to information, it is generally available" (individual responsibility), "it is 220 not necessary at the current time" or "I would want to know the outcome of further 221 research" (lack of information), and "I am against universal additives in principle" 222 (distrust of additives). It should be noted that some individuals, although against 223 folate fortification, were willing to pay for fortification on the basis of altruism [32] . face costs is difficult. Consequently respondents may ignore costs as they assume they 241 are not borne by them directly [51, 52] . This is less of an issue in countries where 242 health care co-payments are widespread, or equivalently surcharges and grants are 243 common within the tax system. Another key issue with contingent valuation studies is 244 responder bias. For example, if the responder believes the survey is gathering 245 information to inform priority setting, but they will not incur any costs, they may 246 over-estimate their WTP for programmes they value (and vice versa for programmes 247 they place a negative value on). On the other hand if the respondent believes the 248 survey is to inform fee setting then they may under-estimate their WTP. 
Discussion
264
The impact of MHPs on the loss of consumer choice has largely been ignored during 265 economic evaluations. In some cases the lack of an estimate of the loss of consumer 266 choice may not be an oversight, but rather a reflection of the perspective taken by the 267 evaluators. For example, if a public health system perspective is adopted [54] then it 268 would not be appropriate to include an estimate of the loss of consumer choice.
However, for many health programmes choosing a health system perspective is too 270 restrictive to capture all benefits and costs and consequently may lead to inefficient 271 allocation of resources. Therefore a broader societal perspective may be preferred, in 272 which case including loss of consumer choice would be justified. This is important 273 because a recent review of health care economic evaluations guidelines found that, of 274 a total of 26 guidelines reviewed, a societal perspective is preferred in six countries 275 (Cuba, Finland, France, The Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden) and another five 6 276 countries preferred both a health system and societal perspectives (Austria, Ireland, 277 Italy, Russia, and Spain) [55, 56] . 278
Many MHPs may involve the use of resources that are not typically provided by a 279 public health system (such as water treatment facilities or enforcement costs When a societal perspective is appropriate, the loss of consumer choice should be 296 included in the analysis. Although it is worth noting that the inclusion of the loss of 297 consumer choice in all economic evaluations may raise equity issues. For example, 298 there may be an increased probability that MHPs that largely affect low 299 socioeconomic groups (e.g. smoking in public places) would be more likely to be 300 cost-effective compared to those that largely affect high socioeconomic groups (i.e. 301 cycling), all else being equal. This is because the 'ability-to-pay' effect would 302 decrease the relative loss of consumer choice in the former group. This equity 303 implication may or may not be acceptable to policy makers. 304
When loss of consumer choice has been included in the economic evaluation of MHPs 305 there have been significant limitations in the methodologies used. These include: the 306 methodology used to estimate of the marginal cost of compliance; the unavailability 307 of measures of price elasticity; the impact of income effects of the programme and 308 consequently whether the Marshallian demand curve would be an acceptable proxy 309 for the Hicksian demand curve; double counting of the health impacts; and biased 310 responses and "protest" responses in contingent valuation studies. In particular, 311 double-counting of negative health impacts, such as adverse events, is a key issue 312 since this would bias the economic evaluation against the MHP, and vice versa. To 313 avoid this issue, decision makers could use estimates of the loss of consumer choice 314 as an additional, but distinct, piece of evidence along with the economic evaluation. 315
However if this approach was chosen the decision maker would need to decide how 316 much weight should be applied to each piece of evidence. 317
None of the papers used discrete choice experiments (DCE) to estimate loss of 318 consumer choice due to MHPs. According to Lancaster's economic theory of value, 319 individuals derive utility from the underlying attributes of a good and that preferences 320 (and thus utility) across goods are revealed through their consumption choices [59] . 321
On the basis of this theory, in a DCE respondents choose their preferred alternative 322 from a choice set. Each alternative is described by a bundle of attributes, including 323 cost, with each attribute described using a different level (i.e. $0, $20, $100 etc). The 324 respondents repeatedly choose their preferred alternative from a series of hypothetical 325 choice sets where the levels of each attribute differs [53] . 326
The strength of the DCE approach is that choosing between bundles of goods is an 327 easily comprehended task for respondents and there is evidence that it is both 328 consistent with welfare theory [60, 61] and consistent with that observed in practice 
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